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Leveraging Posterity’s Prosperity? †
By Johannes Brumm, Laurence Kotlikoff, and Felix Kubler*
Our paper examines two  thought-provoking 
papers—Blanchard (2019) (B) and Rachel and 
Summers (2019) (RS)—that rationalize, with-
out outright endorsing, additional US deficit 
spending. B suggests that since US growth 
rates routinely exceed safe interest rates, 
“public debt may have no fiscal cost.”1 RS 
seeks to mitigate what it views as secular stag-
nation by using government borrowing to keep 
the safe rate above the  so-called zero lower 
bound. Given limited space, we specialize in 
criticism. Our paper starts by pointing out that 
the government’s intertemporal budget con-
straint (IBC) limits additional deficit finance 
even were it advantageous at the margin, not 
least because of America’s initial condition—a 
massive fiscal gap. Next, we discuss results on 
efficiency in overlapping generation (OLG) 
models that circumscribe B’s conjecture. We 
then point out that for almost all Americans, 
the safe lending rate is actually their high, not 
Uncle Sam’s low, borrowing rate. This fact 
undermines both studies’ conclusions. We 
also raise concerns about key, but question-
able, B and RS modeling assumptions. Finally, 
we stress that safe rates below growth rates 
don’t necessarily suggest further expanding 
America’s seemingly reckless Ponzi game. We 
1 Blanchard has written extensively about the cons as 
well as the pros of deficit spending. In recent testimony, 
Blanchard calls for reducing US deficit finance unless 
there is an  aggregate-demand shortfall. This suggests that 
he takes his model as illustrative, rather than as a serious 
framework for guiding US fiscal policy. See Reexamining 
the Economic Costs of Debt: Hearing before the House 
Committee on the Budget, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement 
of Olivier Blanchard, expert witness), https://budget.house.
gov/legislation/hearings/reexamining-economic-costs-debt. 
end by cautioning politicians considering more 
deficit finance to follow the Hippocratic oath: 
first, do no harm.
I. The IBC’s Constraint on Ponzi Schemes and 
the US Fiscal Gap
B claims that “if the interest rate paid by the 
government is less than the growth rate, then 
the intertemporal budget constraint facing the 
government no longer binds.” This is an over-
statement. To see why, consider B’s model 
of a closed economy, with its zero growth, 
macro shocks, highly  risk-averse agents, and, 
on average, negative safe rate. If B’s mod-
el’s government, persuaded that the bigger the 
Ponzi scheme the better, borrows all of work-
ers’ savings and transfers them to retirees, next 
period’s capital stock will be zero. This would 
spell game over for both B’s policy and the 
economy.2 Moreover, America’s Ponzi scheme 
is largely being conducted by taxing workers’ 
labor earnings to make transfers to the elderly. 
But as Altig et al. (forthcoming) shows, the 
scope for higher marginal taxation is limited.3 
Indeed, adopting an extra Ponzi scheme fea-
turing, say, a 15 percent marginal tax would 
leave many poor and  middle-class households 
little or no incentive to work. The potential for 
America to extend its Ponzi scheme is further 
limited by its large fiscal gap—its  present-value 
shortfall in intertemporal government budget 
balance under current policy. America’s fiscal 
gap is $33.1 trillion,4 which is 1.5 times the 
2 See Evans, Kotlikoff, and Phillips (2012) and Evans 
(2020). 
3 The median US marginal remaining lifetime net tax 
rate on labor supply is already quite high, at 42 percent. 
Among the young and  middle-aged poor and the top 1 
percent of all ages, it’s above 50 percent. In the case of 
 bottom-quintile  40-year-olds, the seventy-fifth percentile 
value is 77.1 percent.
4 The fiscal gap is a partial equilibrium measure. 
Nonetheless, it is widely used (see European Commission 
2016). 
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current GDP and 2.0 times the US official debt. 
This measure reflects Congressional Budget 
Office  extended-baseline,  long-term projections, 
extrapolations thereof, and an assumed 6.2 per-
cent real discount rate—the average postwar 
real return on national wealth.5 On a flow basis, 
the fiscal gap is 6.2 percent of annual GDP—
more than two Medicare programs! A positive 
fiscal gap, let alone a massive one, spells explicit 
or implicit default. Eliminating Uncle Sam’s 
fiscal gap, while sustaining scheduled outlays, 
requires permanently raising the path of federal 
revenues by 34 percent starting immediately.6 
Clearly, delaying the adjustment lets older gen-
erations fully or partially off the hook. This is 
the grim,  zero-sum calculus underlying gener-
ational policy.7 It’s also the appropriate starting 
point for simulating additional intergenerational 
redistribution. B’s model, however, assumes no 
initial government. This helps it generate a safe 
rate that’s lower than the growth rate. But the 
assumption casts doubt on B’s results since the 
marginal benefit from intergenerational trans-
fers decreases in their size.
II. Pareto Efficiency in an OLG Economy
Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) show 
that deterministic OLG models can, under the 
right circumstances, run  Pareto-efficient Ponzi 
schemes. Blanchard and Weil (1992) shows 
that with risk, the safe rate can be less than the 
growth rate in dynamically efficient economies. 
Demange (2002) examines the issue in econo-
mies with uncertainty and incomplete markets. 
Demange shows that the differential between the 
growth rate and the average safe rate does not, 
by itself, signal the efficacy of a Ponzi scheme.  
This is particularly true when returns to risky 
5 We derive annual real returns on national wealth by dif-
ferencing national wealth across adjacent years, subtracting 
national savings out of labor earnings, and dividing by ini-
tial national wealth. Using lower discount rates generates a 
significantly higher fiscal gap. Using the government’s pre-
ferred real discount rate of 3 percent yields a fiscal gap of 
$165 trillion, with larger requisite policy adjustments. 
6 The requisite tax hikes are 53 percent starting in 2030 
and 78 percent starting in 2040.
7 See Kotlikoff (2002). The fiscal gap’s size relative to 
official debt attests to American politicians’ prowess at keep-
ing liabilities off the books. 
assets are high—the current case.8 Moreover, 
policies that redistribute across generations may 
be Pareto improving, not because they provide 
higher than comparable  risk-adjusted market 
returns but because they improve intergenera-
tional risk sharing  (see Shiller 1999 and Bohn 
1998).9 Krueger and Kubler (2006) considers 
 pay-go Social Security in this regard. It shows 
that Social Security’s intergenerational risk 
sharing is useful but too small to compensate 
for capital’s crowding out. Note that neither 
Krueger and Kubler (2006) nor B nor this paper 
takes a stand on the government’s role in intra-
generational  risk sharing.
III. The Effective Safe Rate and the Safe Labor 
Endowment Assumption
B and RS equate the safe rate with returns 
on  short-term Treasuries. B points out that real 
growth rates routinely exceed real safe ( 1- to 
 10-year US bond) rates, with current differen-
tials running between 100 and 200 basis points. 
But close to 90 percent of Americans are in debt, 
and their safe real rates—the real rates they can 
earn for sure by  prepaying their mortgages, 
credit card balances, student debt, etc.—equal or 
exceed the real growth rate.10 Such  debt-ridden 
Americans would be worse off if forced to par-
ticipate in a Ponzi scheme paying the growth 
8 The real return on US national wealth has averaged 
7.9 percent since 2010.
9 To see the distinction between  risk sharing and a Ponzi 
scheme, modify B’s  two-period model to include agents 
working when old if they don’t randomly become dis-
abled.  Now workers face  second-period asset income and 
labor earnings risk. The government has no safe asset in 
which to invest. If it borrows, invests in capital, and taxes 
bond holders its excess return, “safe” debt is identical to 
risky capital. But if the net taxes are levied only on the 
 nondisabled, bonds become a valued  risk-mitigating asset, 
and their return can be driven far below zero. This scheme 
could be, and to some extent is, implemented through pro-
gressive taxation. If, observing this gap between growth and 
safe rates, the government decides to institute an “efficient” 
Ponzi scheme with a fixed pension benefit financed on a 
 pay-go basis by taxes on workers, net wages when young 
will be more variable, raising  generation-specific risk and 
potentially producing an outcome in which no generation is 
better off and at least one is worse off. 
10 Bill Fay, “Consumer Debt Statistics and Demographics 
in America,” Debt.org, December 19, 2018, https://www.
debt.org/faqs/ americans-in-debt/demographics/.
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rate rather than their higher borrowing rate.11 
If the scheme is implemented by borrowing 
from savers with subsequent debt rollovers, 
borrowers won’t be forced to earn what is, for 
them, a  below-market return. But they will be 
forced, due to capital’s induced crowding out, 
to pay even higher borrowing rates. And along 
paths in which the scheme fails—due to crowd-
ing out, economic shocks, or both—borrowers, 
like lenders, will have to pay higher lifetime 
net taxes. Were B to calibrate his model to the 
US  weighted-average safe borrowing/lending 
rate or to formally include borrowers, his Ponzi 
schemes would surely be less likely to achieve 
Pareto improvements.12 Another concern is 
that B’s model assumes that workers receive a 
 time-invariant wage endowment equal to half 
the average wage. As a result, B can run a lim-
ited Ponzi scheme with no risk whatsoever.13 
Evans (2020) and Hasanhodzic (2020) consider 
versions of B’s model with two- and  ten-period 
lived agents, respectively. They report signifi-
cant expected utility losses among future gen-
erations from running B’s policies. Since these 
losses are much smaller when wages are safer, 
their results demonstrate the important role of 
the safe labor endowment assumption in B’s 
calibration.
IV. The Closed Economy Assumption
Most US debt is held abroad, yet B models a 
closed US economy. Moreover, as recent sim-
ulations of the Global Gaidar Model (GGM) 
(see Benzell et al. 2018)—a  17-region global 
life cycle model—show, the United States is 
11 Take Joe, who is borrowing at, say, 8 percent—that is, 
Joe is willing to give up $1.00 this year for $1.08 more next 
year, and vice versa. But the Ponzi scheme forces him to 
swap $1.00 this year for, say, just $1.03 next year.
12 Currently, 1- and  10-year Treasuries are yielding 
1.52  percent and 1.91 percent, respectively. Yes, nominal 
GDP growth is running at 3.82 percent. But prevailing rates 
on  30-year mortgages, credit cards, and undergraduate loans 
are 3.87 percent, 19.2 percent, and 4.53 percent, respectively. 
Even when adjusted for default risk, the ( weighted-average) 
rate at which Americans are borrowing is, not least due 
to intermediation costs, probably much higher than the 
 nominal growth rate.
13 An earnings endowment lasting forever, let alone one 
equal to half of average wages, is hard to swallow given 
changes in technology and international competition. This 
is not to mention the long history of economies collapsing 
because of wars, revolutions, plagues, and mismanagement. 
already effectively a small open economy.14 
This will become increasingly true as its share 
of world GDP falls from 15 percent now to a 
 GGM-predicted 4 percent by 2100. B mentions 
the need to revisit his study in an open economy. 
Doing so would likely portray US Ponzi schemes 
as  beggar-thy-neighbor policies that are good for 
the United States and bad for the rest of the world 
because they reduce global investment. Stated 
differently, a Ponzi scheme run by the United 
States might be Pareto improving for Americans 
but not for the world as a whole.15 As for RS, 
it models a larger, closed, deterministic16 econ-
omy, namely the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), justi-
fying this approach by pointing to the OECD’s 
small current account imbalance with the rest of 
the world. This raises several problems. First, 
the OECD countries are highly heterogeneous, 
making it hard to draw policy conclusions for 
individual countries.17 Second, a small current 
account imbalance doesn’t mean that the OECD 
economy behaves, at the margin, like a closed 
economy.18 Third, in ignoring  non-OECD coun-
tries, RS ignores China, India, the Middle East, 
and sub-Saharan Africa. Collectively, these 
regions account for one-third of current world 
output. Moreover, the United Nations proj-
ects that their collective population will rise 
by almost 3.5 billion by 2100. Combined with 
even slow  catch-up productivity growth, this 
demographic trend will, by GGM’s reckoning, 
leave these  RS-excluded regions with two-thirds 
of 2100 world output. Their growth will also 
14 The GGM is calibrated to UN demographic and 
International Monetary Fund fiscal data and features 
 region-specific productivity catch-up.
15 Moreover, if other countries follow the lead of the 
United States, the policy might boomerang as less capital 
flows into the United States than would otherwise have.
16 That is, RS argues for deficit finance based on low pre-
vailing safe rates using a model in which safe rates lower 
than risky rates don’t arise. Their implied assumption of a 
constant risk premium is belied by the data. 
17 For instance, even if increased savings within the 
OECD were a major driving force of the alleged secular 
stagnation, the United States seems to be an exception that 
might call for different policy conclusions. Over the past 
seven decades, starting with the fifties, the US net national 
saving rate has averaged 13.6, 14.7, 11.1, 7.2, 5.6, 3.0, and 
3.0 percent.
18 The Rybczynski theorem tells us that under free trade, 
nothing necessarily pins down the location of capital and, 
thus, a country’s or region’s current account.
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 produce an enormous demand for capital. This is 
why the GGM shows the world interest rate ris-
ing by 200 basis points through  mid-century and 
remaining high thereafter. Hence, RS need not 
worry about secular stagnation. There is likely 
to be ample global demand for capital from the 
regions that paper fails to model.
V. Warning to Politicians
The level of safe interest rates reflects, 
among many other things, people’s desire 
for insurance and the precise structure of 
 government-engineered risk mitigation and 
risk generation. Return to B’s model and con-
jure a government that drives the safe rate far 
below zero by randomly redistributing among 
the elderly, leaving a large fraction impover-
ished. Yet this malevolent government slavishly 
services its bonds. Consequently, government 
bonds become the only way to limit risk—both 
 government-redistribution risk and investment 
risk. In this policy setting, the addition of even a 
risky Ponzi scheme, effected through the sale of 
bonds, could be welfare improving. But, clearly, 
the way for the government to mitigate risk and 
raise all cohorts’ welfare is to stop producing 
risk. More generally, we need to understand pre-
cisely why safe rates are low and whether we can 
expect them to stay low before suggesting further 
leveraging the prosperity of America’s posterity. 
In closing, a warning to politicians. Do no harm 
should be your watchwords, particularly when it 
comes to administering higher doses of an eco-
nomic  cure-all that appears to be gravely imper-
iling today’s and tomorrow’s children.
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